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Abstract—Power system security assessment methods require
large datasets of operating points to train or test their per-
formance. As historical data often contain limited number of
abnormal situations, simulation data are necessary to accurately
determine the security boundary. Generating such a database is
an extremely demanding task, which becomes intractable even
for small system sizes. This paper proposes a modular and highly
scalable algorithm for computationally efficient database gener-
ation. Using convex relaxation techniques and complex network
theory, we discard large infeasible regions and drastically reduce
the search space. We explore the remaining space by a highly
parallelizable algorithm and substantially decrease computation
time. Our method accommodates numerous definitions of power
system security. Here we focus on the combination of N-k security
and small-signal stability. Demonstrating our algorithm on IEEE
14-bus and NESTA 162-bus systems, we show how it outperforms
existing approaches requiring less than 10% of the time other
methods require.
Index Terms—Convex relaxation, data-driven, power system
analysis, small-signal stability
I. INTRODUCTION
SECURITY assessment is a fundamental function for bothshort-term and long-term power system operation. Op-
erators need to eliminate any probability of system failure
on a sub-hourly basis, and need to guarantee the security
of supply in the long-term, having the required infrastructure
and operating practices in place. All these functions require
the assessment of thousands of possibilities with respect to
load patterns, system topology, power generation, and the
associated uncertainty which is taking up a more profound
role with the increased integration of renewable energy sources
(RES). Millions of possible operating points violate operating
constraints and lead to an insecure system, while millions
satisfy all limitations and ensure safe operation. For systems
exceeding the size of a few buses it is impossible to assess the
total number of operating points, as the problem complexity
explodes. Therefore, computationally efficient methods are
necessary to perform a fast and accurate dynamic security
assessment.
Numerous approaches exist in the literature proposing meth-
ods to assess or predict different types of instability, e.g.
transient, small-signal, or voltage instability. Recently, with
the abundance of data from sensors, such as smart meters and
phasor measurement units, machine learning approaches have
emerged showing promising results in tackling this problem
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[1]–[4]. Due to the high reliability of the power system oper-
ation, however, historical data are not sufficient to train such
techniques, as information related to the security boundary or
insecure regions is often missing. For that, simulation data are
necessary.
This paper deals with the fundamental problem that most
of the dynamic security assessment (DSA) methods are con-
fronted with before the implementation of any algorithm: the
generation of the necessary dataset which is required for the
development of dynamic security classification approaches.
With this work we aim to propose a modular and scalable
algorithm that can map the secure and insecure regions,
and identify the security boundaries of large systems in a
computationally efficient manner.
There are two main challenges with the generation of such
a database. First, the problem size. It is computationally
impossible to assess all possible operating points for systems
exceeding a few tens of buses. Second, the information quality.
Dynamic security assessment is a non-convex and highly
nonlinear problem. Generating an information-rich and not too
large dataset can lead to algorithms that can be trained faster
and achieve higher prediction accuracy.
The efforts to develop a systematic and computationally effi-
cient methodology to generate the required database have been
limited up to date. In [5], [6] re-sampling techniques based on
post-rule validation were used to enrich the database with sam-
ples close to the boundary. Genc et al. [7] propose to enrich the
database iteratively with additional points close to the security
boundary by adding operating points at half the distance of the
already existing operating points at the stability boundary. In
[2], [8]–[11], the authors propose to use importance sampling
methods based on Monte-Carlo variance reduction (MCVR)
technique, introducing a bias in the sampling process such that
the representation of rare events increases in the assessment
phase. In [12], the authors propose a composite modelling
approach using high dimensional historical data.
This work leverages advancements in several different fields
to propose a highly scalable, modular, and computationally
efficient method. Using properties derived from convex re-
laxation techniques applied on power systems, we drastically
reduce the search space. Applying complex network theory
approaches, we identify the most critical contingencies boost-
ing the efficiency of our search algorithms. Based on steepest
descent methods, we design the exploration algorithm in a
highly parallelizable fashion, and exploit parallel computing to
reduce computation time. Compared with existing approaches,
our method achieves a speed-up of 10 to 20 times, requiring
less than 10% of the time other approaches need to achieve
the same results.
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The contributions of this work are the following:
• We propose a computationally efficient and highly scal-
able method to generate the required datasets for the train-
ing or testing of dynamic security assessment methods.
Our approach requires less than 10% of the time existing
methods need for results of similar quality.
• Our method is modular and can accommodate several
types of security boundaries, including transient stability
and voltage stability. In this paper, we demonstrate our
approach considering the combination of N-k security and
small signal stability.
• Besides the database generation, the methodology we
propose can be easily employed in real-time operation,
where computationally efficient techniques are sought
to explore the security region in case of contingencies
around the current operating point.
• In case studies we demonstrate the importance of a high
quality database to achieve the best possible results in
a data-driven security assessment. Given equal computa-
tion time, training machine learning algorithms with the
database generated by our method clearly outperforms
other approaches.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: First,
a set of terms are defined in Section II. In Section III, we
describe the challenges of the database generation for data-
driven security analysis. Section IV provides an overview
of the methodology, which we detail in the two subsequent
sections. Section V describes how we reduce the search space,
while Section VI describes the highly parallelizable explo-
ration of the remaining space. We demonstrate our methods
in Section VIII. Section IX concludes the paper.
II. DEFINITIONS
1) Security boundary: the boundary γ dividing the secure
from the insecure region; (a) can correspond to a specific sta-
bility boundary, e.g. small-signal stability or voltage stability,
(b) can represent a specific stability margin, i.e. all operating
points not satisfying the stability margin belong to the insecure
region, (c) can be a combination of security indices, e.g. the
intersection of operating points that are both N-1 secure and
small-signal stable. Note that our proposed method can apply
to any security boundary the user needs to consider.
2) HIC – High Information Content: the set Ω of operating
points in the vicinity of the security boundary γ, see (2) [10].
This is the search space of high interest for our methods as it
separates the secure from insecure regions.
3) DW – Directed Walk: we use this term to denote the
steepest descent path our algorithm follows, starting from a
given initialization point, in order to arrive close to the security
boundary.
III. CHALLENGES OF THE DATABASE GENERATION
Determining the secure region of a power system is an NP-
hard problem. In an ideal situation, in order to accurately
determine the non-convex secure region we need to discretize
the whole space of operating points with an as small interval as
possible, and perform a security assessment for each of those
points. For a given system topology, this set consists primarily
of all possible combinations of generator and load setpoints
(Note that if the system includes tap-changing transformers,
and other controllable devices, the number of credible points
increases geometrically). Thus, in a classical brute force
approach, the number of points to be considered is given by:
|Ψ| = Λ ·
NG−1∏
i=1
(Pmaxi − Pmini
α
+ 1
)
, (1)
where NG is the number of generators i, Pmaxi and P
min
i
is their maximum and minimum capacity, α is the chosen
discretization interval between the generation setpoints, and Λ
represents the number of different load profiles. For example,
for the IEEE 14 bus system [13] with 5 generators and
a discretization interval of α = 1 MW, a classical brute
force approach requires |Ψ| ≈ 2.5 · 106 operating points to
be assessed for a single load profile. It can be easily seen
that security assessment of large systems can very fast result
in an intractable problem. For example, in the NESTA 162
bus system [14], a brute force approach would require the
analysis of 7 · 1029 points. It becomes clear that the efficient
database generation is one of the major challenges for the
implementation of data-driven tools in power system security
analysis. In this effort, we need to balance the trade-off
between two partially contradicting goals: keep the database as
small as possible to minimize computational effort, but contain
enough data to determine the security boundary as accurately
as possible. To better illustrate our approach, in Fig. 1 we show
all possible operating points of two generators for a certain
load profile in a system. Focusing on small-signal stability
here, we define the security boundary γ as a certain level of
minimum damping ratio, which corresponds to our stability
margin. All safe operating points, with a damping ratio below
γ, are plotted in blue, while operating points that do not fulfill
the stability margin are plotted in yellow. From Fig.1, it is
obvious that if we are able to assess all points close to γ,
it is easy to classify the rest of the points. By that, the size
of the required database can be significantly reduced. In the
remainder of this paper, we will call the set of operating points
in the vicinity of γ as the set of high information content
(HIC), defined as follows:
Ω = {OPk ∈ Ψ | γ − µ < γk < γ + µ}, (2)
with γk denoting the value of the chosen stability margin for
operating point OPk and µ representing an appropriate small
value to let |Ω| be large enough to describe the desired security
boundary with sufficient accuracy. The value of µ depends
on the chosen discretization interval in the vicinity of the
boundary. In Fig. 1, the HIC set, i.e. all points OPk ∈ Ω,
Fig. 1. Scatter plot of all possible operating points of two generators for a
certain load profile. Operating points fulfilling the stability margin and outside
the high information content (HIC) region (γk > 3.25%) are marked in blue,
those not fulfilling the stability margin and outside HIC (γk < 2.75%) are
marked in yellow. Operating points located in the HIC region (2.75% < γx <
3.25%) are marked in grey.
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is visualized as the grey area surrounding γ. In this small
example, we were able to assess all possible operating points
and accurately determine the HIC area. For large systems this
is obviously not possible. As a result, in the general case, the
main challenge is to find the points OPk which belong to the
HIC area |Ω|.
To put the difference between |Ψ| and |Ω| in perspective:
for the small signal stability analysis of the IEEE 14 bus
system, the classical brute force approach requires the analysis
of |Ψ| ≈ 2.5 · 106 operating points (OPs) for a single load
profile. By assuming a required damping ratio of γ = 3 %,
and µ = 0.25 %, the HIC set, defined as Ω = {OPk ∈
Ψ | 2.75 % < γk < 3.25 %}, reduces the analysis to only
1457 points (here, γ refers to the damping ratio of the lowest
damped eigenvalue). In other words, by assessing only 0.06 %
of all data points, we can accurately determine the whole
secure region of this example.
This small amount of required operating points to assess
has actually worked as an obstacle for one of the most
popular approaches in previous works: importance sampling.
Importance sampling re-orients the sampling process towards
a desired region of interest in the sampling space, while
also preserving the probability distribution. Thus, it requires
that the initial sampling points include sufficient knowledge
about the desired region of interest. However, the smaller
the proportion of the region of interest is in respect to the
entire multi-dimensional space, the larger the initial sample
size needs to be to include a sufficient number of points
within the desired region of interest. Therefore, the use of
expert knowledge [5], [6], [10], regression models [2] or
linear sensitivities [10] are proposed to determine the desired
region and reduce the search space. However, since this search
space reduction is based on a limited initial sample size,
it entails the risk of either missing regions of interest not
represented in the initial sample or requires a large initial
sample which increases computational burden. Furthermore,
previous works [7], [10] often use expert knowledge to reduce
the burden of the N-1 security assessment to a few critical
contingencies. Our proposed method does not require expert
knowledge and avoids potential biases by not separating the
knowledge extraction from the sampling procedure. Still, if
expert knowledge of e.g. a preferred search region or the
most critical contingencies is available, our method can easily
integrate it and benefit from it.
IV. METHODOLOGY
We divide the proposed methodology in two main parts.
First, the search space reduction by the elimination of a
large number of infeasible (and insecure) operating points.
Second, the directed walks: a steepest-descent based algorithm
to explore the search space and accurately determine the
security boundary. During the search space reduction, we
exploit properties of convex relaxation techniques to discard
large infeasible regions. In order to reduce the problem
complexity, we employ complex network theory approaches
which allow us to identify the most critical contingencies.
Finally, designing the directed walks as a highly parallelizable
algorithm, we use parallel computing capabilities to drastically
reduce the computation time.
The different parts are described in detail in the following
sections. Our algorithm starts by uniformly sampling the
search space using the Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS)
method to generate initialization points for the subsequent
steps (Section V-A). Following that, we propose a convex
grid pruning algorithm, which also considers contingency
constraints, to discard infeasible regions and reduce the search
space (Section V-B). In Section V-C, we leverage complex
network theory approaches to identify the most critical contin-
gencies. The identified contingency set is crucial both for the
grid pruning algorithm, and for subsequent steps within the Di-
rected Walks. After resampling the now significantly reduced
search space, we use these samples as initialization points for
the Directed Walk (DW) algorithm, described in Section VI.
In order to achieve an efficient database generation, the goal
of the algorithm is to traverse as fast as possible large parts of
the feasible (or infeasible) region, while carrying out a high
number of evaluations inside the HIC region. This allows the
algorithm to focus on the most relevant areas of the search
space in order to accurately determine the security boundary.
The DWs are highly parallelizable, use a variable step size
depending on their distance from the security boundary, and
follow the direction of the steepest descent. Defining the secure
region as the N-2 secure and small signal stable region in our
case studies, we demonstrate how our method outperforms
existing importance sampling approaches, achieving a 10 to
20 times speed-up.
V. REDUCING THE SEARCH SPACE
A. Choice of Initialization Points
An initial set of operating points is necessary to start our
computation procedure. Using the Latin Hypercube Sampling
(LHS), we sample the space of operating points to select
the initialization points η. Besides the initialization points at
the first stage, η1, our method requires the finer selection of
initialization samples, η2 and η3 during the reduction of the
search space in two subsequent stages, as will be explained
later. We use the same sampling procedure at all stages. The
Latin hypercube sampling (LHS) aims to achieve a uniform
distribution of samples across the whole space. Dividing each
dimension in subsections, LHS selects only one sample from
each subsection of each parameter, while, at the same time,
it maximizes the minimum distance between the samples [2].
An even distribution of the initialization points over the multi-
dimensional space is of high importance in order to increase
the probability that our method does not miss any infeasible
region or any HIC region. The number of initialization points
|η| is a tuning factor which depends on the specific system
under investigation. In general, quite sparse discretization
intervals are used for the search space reduction procedures
in the first two stages of our approach, η1−2, while a more
dense discretization interval is used for the directed walks at a
later stage, η3. Suitable values are discussed in the case study.
While LHS allows an even sampling, it is very computationally
expensive for high-dimensional spaces and large numbers of
initialization points. Thus, for larger systems there is a trade-
off between initial sampling and computation time that needs
to be considered.
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B. Grid Pruning Algorithm For Search Space Reduction
Given the η1 initialization points from the first stage, the
aim of this stage is to reduce the search space by elimi-
nating infeasible operating regions. For that, we use a grid
pruning algorithm which relies on the concept of convex
relaxations. The algorithm is inspired by [15], where it was
developed to compute the feasible space of small AC optimal
power flow (OPF) problems. In this work, we introduce a
grid pruning algorithm which determines infeasible operating
regions considering not only the intact system but also all N-1
contingencies.
Convex relaxations have been recently proposed to relax the
non-convex AC-OPF to a semidefinite program [16]. A corol-
lary of that method is that the resulting semidefinite relaxation
provides an infeasibility certificate: If an initialization point is
infeasible for the semidefinite relaxation, it is guaranteed to be
infeasible for the non-convex AC-OPF problem. This means
that for that initialization point there does not exist a power
flow solution which complies with all operational constraints
(i.e. voltage limits, active / reactive power limits). A feasible
power flow solution is a basic requirement for a security
assessment using any stability metric. This property of the
semidefinite relaxation is used in our grid pruning algorithm.
The semidefinite relaxation introduces the matrix variable
W to represent the product of real and imaginary parts of the
complex bus voltages (for more details the interested reader is
referred to [16], [17]). Defining our notation, the investigated
power grid consists of N buses, where G is the set of generator
buses. We consider a set of line outages C, where the first
entry {0} of set C corresponds to the intact system state. The
following auxiliary variables are introduced for each bus i ∈
N and outage c ∈ C:
Y ci := eie
T
i Y
c (3)
Yci :=
1
2
[<{Y ci + (Y ci )T } ={(Y ci )T − Y ci }
={Y ci − (Y ci )T } <{Y ci + (Y ci )T }
]
(4)
Y¯ci :=
−1
2
[={Y ci + (Y ci )T } <{Y ci − (Y ci )T }
<{(Y ci )T − Y ci } ={Y ci + (Y ci )T }
]
(5)
Mi :=
[
eie
T
i 0
0 eie
T
i
]
(6)
Matrix Y c denotes the bus admittance matrix of the power
grid for outage c, and ei is the i-th basis vector. The operators
< and = denote the real and imaginary parts of the matrix.
The initialization points η1 from stage A (see Section V-A)
correspond to both feasible and infeasible operating points for
the AC optimal power flow problem. Given a set-point P ∗ for
the generation dispatch (corresponding to initialization point
η∗1), (7) – (13) compute the minimum distance from P
∗ to
the closest feasible generation dispatch. Obviously, if P ∗ is a
feasible generation dispatch, the minimum distance is zero.
min
W c
√∑
i∈G
(Tr{Y0iW 0}+ PDi − P ∗i )2 (7)
s.t.PGi ≤ Tr{YciW c}+ PDi ≤ PGi ∀i ∈ N ∀c ∈ C (8)
Q
Gi
≤ Tr{Y¯ciW c}+QDi ≤ QGi ∀i ∈ N ∀c ∈ C (9)
V 2i ≤ Tr{MiW c} ≤ V
2
i ∀i ∈ N ∀c ∈ C (10)
W c  0 ∀c ∈ C (11)
Tr{YciW c} = Tr{Y0iW 0} ∀i ∈ G\{slack} ∀c ∈ C
(12)
Tr{MiW c} = Tr{MiW 0} ∀i ∈ G ∀c ∈ C (13)
The matrix variable W 0 refers to the intact system state with
admittance matrix Y0. The objective function (7) minimizes
the distance of the active generation dispatch from the set-point
P ∗. The operator Tr{} denotes the trace of a matrix. For each
outage c ∈ C, one matrix variable W c is introduced which
is constrained to be positive semidefinite in (11). The terms
PGi , PGi , QGi , QGi in the nodal active and reactive power
balance (8) and (9) are the maximum and minimum active and
reactive power limits of the generator at bus i, respectively.
The active and reactive power demand at bus i is denoted
with the terms PDi and QDi . The bus voltages at each bus i
are constrained by upper and lower bounds V i and V i in (10).
In case of an outage, the generator active power and voltage
set-points remain fixed (12) – (13), as traditional N-1 (and
N-k) calculations do not consider corrective control. To reduce
the computational complexity of the semidefinite constraint
(11), we apply a chordal decomposition according to [17]
and enforce positive semidefiniteness only for the maximum
cliques of matrix W c. To obtain an objective function linear
in W 0, we introduce the auxiliary variable R and replace (7)
with:
min
W c,R
R (14)
s.t.
√∑
i∈G
(Tr{Y0iW 0}+ PDi − P ∗i )2 ≤ R (15)
The convex optimization problem (8) – (15) guarantees that
the hypersphere with radius R around the operating point
P ∗ does not contain any points belonging to the non-convex
feasible region, considering both the intact system state and
the contingencies in set C. Note that the obtained closest
generation dispatch P 0i = Tr{Y0iW 0} + PDi is feasible in
the relaxation but not necessarily in the non-convex problem.
Hence, with R we obtain a lower bound of the distance to
the closest feasible generation dispatch in the non-convex
problem.
In a procedure similar to [18], we apply an iterative algo-
rithm for the grid pruning: First, given η1 initialization points,
we solve (8) – (15) without considering contingencies, i.e.
C = {0}. Using the determined hyperspheres, we eliminate the
infeasible operating regions and, using LHS, we resample the
reduced search space to select a set of initialization points η2.
In the next stage, given η2, we determine the five most critical
contingencies (see section V-C for more details) and resolve
(8) – (15). We remove all resulting infeasible regions from
the set η2, and using LHS we resample the remaining feasible
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Fig. 2. Search space reduction obtained by the proposed grid pruning
algorithm for the IEEE 14 bus system. Operating points within the structure
formed by superimposed spheres are infeasible considering N-1 security.
region to determine the initialization set η3. The number of
considered contingencies is a trade-off between the amount
of obtained infeasible points and the required computational
time to solve the semidefinite relaxation. The number of
initialization points η1−2 should be chosen to minimize the
overlapping of the hyperspheres while maximizing the search
space reduction. As all η2 points within the infeasible region
are immediately discarded, a value η2 > η1 is required in order
to obtain a smaller distance between the initialization points
and, thus more points within the feasible region than before.
However, the more the resulting hyperspheres are overlapping
(as. e.g. visualized in Fig. 2), the less information every point
is providing and the less computationally efficient the grid
pruning is. Thus, the choice depends also on the system size, as
the same number of initialization points will lead to different
distances between the points depending on the system size.
Finally, η3 needs to be chosen large enough to obtain sufficient
initialization points for the directed walks but not too large in
order to avoid too many duplicates being created during the
walks.
As an example of the search space reduction, we consider
the IEEE 14 bus system in a scenario where all but three
generators (Pgen2−4) are fixed to specific values. Considering
the five most critical contingencies, and using our proposed
convex grid pruning algorithm, the search space is reduced by
65.34 %. This is visualized in Fig. 2; the colored area shows
the discarded regions of infeasible points as determined by the
superposition of the spheres.
C. Determining the Most Critical Contingencies
From the definition of N-1 security criterion it follows that
a single contingency suffices to classify an operating point
as infeasible. Most of the unsafe operating points, however,
belong to the infeasible regions of several contingencies.
As a result, focusing only on a limited number of critical
contingencies, we can accurately determine a large part of the
N-k insecure region, thus reducing the search space without
the need to carry out a redundant number of computations
for the whole contingency set. This drastically decreases the
computation time.
The goal of this section is to propose a methodology that
determines the most critical contingencies, which can then be
used both in the convex grid pruning algorithm (8) – (15), and
in the step direction of the DWs in Section VI-2. While clas-
sical N-1 (and N-k) analyses are computationally demanding,
recent approaches based on complex network theory showed
promising results while requiring a fraction of that time. Refs.
[19], [20] propose fast identification of vulnerable lines and
nodes, using concepts such as the (extended) betweenness or
the centrality index.
The centrality index used in [20], and first proposed for
power systems in [21], [22], is based on a classical optimiza-
tion problem in complex network theory, known as maximum
flow problem. The index refers to the portion of the flow
passing through a specific edge in the network. Components
with higher centrality have a higher impact on the vulnerability
of the system, and thus have higher probability to be critical
contingencies.
Similar to [20], we adopt an improved max-flow formulation
for the power system problem which includes vertex weights,
and extends the graph with a single global source and a single
global sink node. The improved formulation accounts for the
net load and generation injections at every vertex, avoids line
capacity violations resulting from the superposition of different
source-sink combinations, and decreases computation time.
Contrary to [20], however, we use a modified definition of
the centrality index. While Fang et al. [20] analyze the most
critical contingencies for all generation and demand patterns,
we are interested in the most critical contingency for every
specific load and generation profile, i.e. for every operating
point OPk. Thus, for each operating point OPk we define the
centrality index as:
C
(k)
ij = f
(k)
ij,actual/f
(k)
max ∀i, j ∈ N , (16)
where f (k)ij,actual, are the actual flows for that operating point
OPk, and f
(k)
max represents the maximum possible flow be-
tween global source and global sink node for the same case.
Thus, at every operating point OPk, the lines are ranked
according to their contribution to the maximum flow in the
system. The higher their centrality index is, the more vulnera-
ble becomes the system in case they fail, and as a result they
are placed higher in the list of most critical contingencies.
The case study includes a brief discussion about the per-
formance of this vulnerability assessment for the investigated
systems. Despite the drastic decrease in computation time
and its general good performance, the proposed approach still
includes approximations. As we will see in Sections VI-7–
VI-8, we take all necessary steps to ensure that we have
avoided any possible misclassification.
VI. DIRECTED WALKS
1) Variable Step Size: As mentioned in Section III, to
achieve an efficient database generation our focus is to assess
a sufficiently high number of points inside the HIC area, while
traverse the rest of the space faster and with fewer evaluations.
To do that, we propose to use a variable step size α depending
on the distance d of the operating point from the security
boundary γ. The distance d(OPk) of the operating point under
investigation is defined as:
d(OPk) = |γk − γ| , (17)
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γ = ζmin
I
m
{
λ}
2-dim. subspace of multi-dim. space of
potential generation patterns (remaining
dim. held constant for illustration)
OPinit
OPstep1
OPstep2
± dλ
dPgen1
± dλ
dPgen2
OPstep3
λmin ζ,OPinit
λmin ζ,OPstep1
λmin ζ,OPstep2
λmin ζ,OPstep3
step size α
γ
α1
α2 α3
Re{λ}
dinit
dinit
dstep1
dstep2
P
g
e
n
2
Pgen1
OPs with
Eigenspace of all Γ + 1 analyzed systems (only lowest
damped (pair) of eigenvalues of all systems shown)
high information
content region
OPstep4−κ
OPssaved add.
Fig. 3. Illustration of the Directed Walk (DW) through a two dimensional space using varying step sizes, αi, following the steepest descent of distance, d.
with γk being the stability index value for operating point
OPk. Then, for OPk we define the variable step size αk as
follows:
αk =

1 · Pmax, if d(OPk) > d1
2 · Pmax, if d1 ≥ d(OPk) > d2
3 · Pmax, if d2 ≥ d(OPk) > d3
4 · Pmax, otherwise
, (18)
where Pmax is the vector of generator maximum capacities,
1−4 are scalars, and for distances d1−3 holds d1 > d2 > d3.
Since the system is highly nonlinear (in our case study for
example we are searching for the minimum damping ratio
considering N-1 security, i.e. |C| different nonlinear systems
superimposed), the exact step size required to reach the HIC
region cannot be constant or determined a-priori. Thus, the
step size is gradually reduced as we approach the security
boundary in order not to miss any points within the HIC
region. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.
It follows that distances d1−3 and the corresponding 1−4
are tuning factors, to be chosen depending on the desired
speed, granularity, precision and given system size. Factors
found useful for given systems are discussed in the case study.
2) Determining the Step Direction: After identifying the
step size, we need to determine the direction of the next step.
Our goal is to traverse the feasible (or infeasible) region as fast
as possible, and enter the HIC region. To do that, at every step
we follow the steepest descent of the distance metric d(OPk),
as shown in (19).
OPk+1 = OPk − αk · ∇d(OPk) (19)
where αk is the step size for OPk, defined in (18), and
∇d(OPk) is the gradient of d(OPk). As the distance is a
function of the chosen stability index, it is user specific and
∇d(OPk) in the discrete space shall be determined by a suit-
able sensitivity measure, which differs for different stability
indices. If the focus is on voltage stability for example, the
associated margin sensitivities could be used [23]. It is stressed
that our method is suitable for any sensitivity capable of
measuring the distance to the chosen stability index. In the
case studies of this paper, we focus on small-signal stability
and, as described in the next paragraph, we pick the damping
ratio sensitivity as a suitable measure.
Normally, at every step k we should measure distance d for
all N-1 (or N-k) contingencies, select the minimum of those
distances and based on that, determine the next step size and
direction. Having thousands of initialization points η3 implies
checking along all possible dimensions and N-1 contingencies
at every step of thousands of directed walks. Beyond a certain
system size, this becomes computationally intractable. Instead,
we take advantage of the critical contingency identification
procedure described in Section V-C, and at every step we
measure distance d assuming the most critical contingency for
OPk. This reduces the required analysis from |C| systems to
one system, which drastically decreases the computation time.
Following steps in this procedure, as described later, ensure
that this approximation is sufficient and there is an accurate
detection of the security boundary as soon as we enter the
HIC region.
3) Sensitivity Measure for Small-Signal Stability: For
small-signal stability, we determine the step direction by the
sensitivity of the damping ratio, ζ, of the system representing
the most critical contingency, cc ∈ C. This requires to compute
the eigenvalue sensitivity which, in turn, depends on the state
matrix Acc (for more details about forming state matrix A the
reader is referred to [24]). Thus, the sensitivity of eigenvalue
λn to a system parameter ρi is defined as
∂λn
∂ρi
=
ψTn
∂Acc
∂ρi
φn
ψTnφn
. (20)
ψTn and φn are the left and right eigenvectors, respectively,
associated with eigenvalue λn [24]. Defining λn = σn + jωn,
and with ζ = −σn√
σ2n+ω
2
n
, we can determine the damping ratio
sensitivity, ∂ζn∂ρi as
∂ζn
∂ρi
=
∂
∂ρi
(
−σn√
σ2n + ω
2
n
)
= ωn
(σn
∂ωn
∂ρi
− ωn ∂σn∂ρi )
(σ2n + ω
2
n)
3
2
. (21)
Due to the fact that the computation of ∂Acc∂ρi is extremely
demanding, it is usually more efficient to determine the
damping ratio sensitivity of ζ to ρi by a small perturbation of
ρi. The whole process is illustrated in Fig. 3. The parameters
ρi correspond to the power dispatch of two generators. The
DW is illustrated following the steepest descent of damping
ratio considering the lowest damped eigenvalue of the system
representing the most critical contingency cc ∈ C.
4) Parallelization of the Directed Walks: Directed Walks
are easily parallelizable. In our case studies, we have used 80
cores of the DTU HPC cluster for this part of our simulations.
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To ensure an efficient parallelization and not allow individual
processes take up unlimited time, we set a maximum number
of steps of DWs, κmax. The tuning of κmax is discussed in
the case studies in Section VIII.
5) Entering the HIC region: As soon as a DW enters the
HIC region, two additional processes take place. First, all
points surrounding the current operating point are assessed as
well, as they may be part of Ω. This is indicated in Fig. 3 by
the yellow circles. Second, we allow the DW to move along
only a single dimension (the dimension is still selected based
on the steepest descent) and with the minimum step size. This
ensures that we collect as many points within the HIC region
as possible.
6) Termination of the Directed Walks: Each DW terminates
if the next step arrives at an operating point already existing
in the database. The termination criterion excludes operating
points that were collected as “surrounding points” of a current
step (see Section VI-5).
7) Full N-1 contingency check: After all DWs have been
performed for every initialization point in parallel, we evaluate
all safe (and almost safe) operating points in the database
against all possible contingencies to ensure that no violations
occur. More formally, we assess all operating points in the final
database with γk ≥ γ−µ for all remaining |C|− 1 systems to
ensure that a possible false identification of the most critical
contingency does not affect the stability boundary detection.
This allows us to guarantee a high level of accuracy in
determining the security boundary. Despite this being the most
computationally expensive step of our method, accounting for
over 50% of the required time, in absence of expert knowledge
this procedure is required for any method reported in the
literature [8], [9]. The difference is, however, that our approach
manages to discard a large volume of non-relevant data before
this step, and, as a result, outperforms existing methods by
being at least 10 to 20 times faster.
8) Final Set of Directed Walks: The maximum number of
steps κmax, although helpful for the efficient parallelization of
the DWs, may result in DWs that have not sufficiently explored
the search space. In this final step, for any DWs that have
reached κmax while inside the HIC region, we perform an
additional round of DW to explore as thoroughly as possible
the HIC region. The final points from the previous round serve
as initialization points.
VII. EXTENSION TO A N-K ANALYSIS
As the authors in [25] highlight, it is computationally im-
practical to analyze all N-k contingency sequences, due to the
large number of possible contingencies and their combinations.
In order to minimize the number of required analyses, different
approaches exist in literature to find a subset of plausible
harmful N-k contingencies using e.g. time domain simulations
[26], event trees and functional groups [25] or fault chain
theory [27]. Each of these methods can be combined with our
proposed method to determine in advance the list of plausible
N-k contingencies, which can then be used as the set of
considered critical contingencies during the Directed Walks.
In this section, however, as we wish to continue with our
approach of not requiring any kind of expert knowledge, we
extend the security analysis to a N-k scenario. Up to this point,
we have identified the HIC region and the security boundary
considering N-1 security and small-signal stability (“N-1 and
SSS”). Our ultimate goal in this section is to determine how the
HIC region and the security boundary should be adjusted if we
consider N-k security and small-signal stability. To do that, we
start with all stable points in the “N-1 and SSS” HIC region, as
they were identified by the Directed Walks in Section VI. As
described in Section VI-7, a full N-1 contingency assessment
is carried out for every final point of the DWs. As a result, we
have exact knowledge of the impact of all contingencies, and
can rank them from the most critical to the least critical. To
extend our analysis to the N-2 case, we apply the two most
critical contingencies at the same time to our system. Our goal
is to perform Directed Walks from the “N-1 and SSS” HIC
region to the “N-2 and SSS” HIC region, and determine the
new security boundary. Admittedly, the combination of the
two most critical N-1 contingencies is often but not always
the most critical N-2 contingency. The goal of the Directed
Walks, however, is to determine a path that will lead towards
the new HIC region – and several combinations of most critical
contingencies can lead to that. To ensure that no violations
occur, similar to the N-1 case, we perform a N-2 contingency
check (along with small-signal stability) at the end of the new
Directed Walks. This ensures that all operating points which
will land in the database will have been checked if they are
N-2 secure for a wide range of contingencies.
Similar is the procedure that can be followed for enforcing
N-k security, with k>2. Given the combinatorial nature of the
N-k security assessment though, beyond a certain point expert
knowledge or advanced methods must be used in order to
consider only a limited set of critical N-k contingencies.
The different steps are summarized below taking the N-2
security database generation as an example but can be gener-
alized to a N-k case.
A. Initialization Points
As already mentioned, the initialization points for the “N-
2 and SSS” security assessment are the final points of the
Directed Walks during the “N-1 and SSS” procedure described
in Section VI. More specifically, it is all stable points be-
longing to the “N-1 and SSS” HIC region. Directed Walks
often result to OPs close to each other. To cover an as
large space as possible keeping the computation time low, we
want to pick initialization points that have at least a certain
distance between each other. As a result, after picking each
initialization point, we assume a radius RN−2 around that
point, and discard any potential initialization point within this
radius. This allows us to have a reduced and more uniformly
distributed set of initialization points to start our assessment.
The choice of RN−2 depends on the maximum number of
steps κmax,N−2 of the directed walks during the N-2 security
database generation. As we aim for avoiding duplicates but
also for maximizing the number of unique OPs within Ω, a
choice of RN−2 ≤ κmax,N−2 · min{αk} is recommended,
where min{αk} is the minimum step size as defined in (18).
B. Most Critical N-2 Contingency
By taking advantage of the full N-1 contingency check,
described in section VI-7, we already know the set with the
most critical contingencies for every initialization point. The
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two most critical contingencies for the N-1 case are used as
the most critical N-2 contingency for the directed walks during
the N-2 security analysis. Please note that the role of the
critical contingencies is to determine an appropriate direction
of the directed walks towards the new HIC region. Similar to
Section VI-7, a N-2 contingency check (for the chosen N-1
fault) will follow in the end again. This ensures that even if the
choice of the most critical N-2 contingency for the directed
walks is inaccurate, it will not necessarily result in a falsely
classified operating point in the database.
C. Directed Walks
The directed walks work exactly in the same way as intro-
duced in Section VI including a full N-2 contingency check
for the given most critical outage (N-1 contingency) in the end.
Ideally, a full N-2 contingency check must be carried out for
all possible combinations. Given the exponential increase in
the number of N-2 contingencies as the system grows larger,
expert knowledge or advanced methods become necessary. In
our case studies, we did not observe significant changes of
the HIC set, while checking for several different pairs of N-2
contingencies. However, in other systems, use of advanced
methods will be probably necessary to select the set of most
critical contingencies to be used for this final check.
VIII. CASE STUDIES
In the first case study, the efficient database generation
method is applied on the IEEE 14 bus system. We measure
the efficiency improvement compared with the brute force ap-
proach (BF), and we demonstrate how our method outperforms
importance sampling techniques. It is impossible to carry out
the comparison with the BF approach in larger systems, as BF
becomes intractable. In the second case study, we demonstrate
the scalability of our method to larger systems, such as the
NESTA 162 bus system [14]. In the same case study, we also
highlight how the proposed method allows to extend a N-1
security to a N-2 security assessment and emphasize how the
high quality of the database generated with our method allow
machine learning algorithms to achieve a higher accuracy in
the data-driven security assessment. The case studies in this
paper use the combination of N-1 (or N-2) security and small-
signal stability for the definition of the security boundary.
It should be stressed though that the proposed methodology
proposes a general framework and is applicable to a number
of other stability metrics or power system models.
A. Small-Signal Model
A sixth order synchronous machine model [28] with an
Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) Type I (3 states) is used
in this study. With an additional state for the bus voltage
measurement delay this leads to a state-space model of 10·NG
states, with NG representing the number of generators in the
grid. In case of the NESTA 162 bus system, all generators
are addtionally equipped with Power System Stabilizers (PSS)
type 1 adding an additional state per generator. The small sig-
nal models were derived using Mathematica, the initialization
and small signal analysis were carried out using Matpower
6.0 [13] and Matlab. Reactive power limits of the generators
are enforced. For a detailed description of the derivation of a
TABLE I
RESULTS: IEEE 14 BUS SYSTEM
Required Time in % OPs in Ω Method
time w.r.t. BF found η1 / η2 / η3 / κmax
2.56 min 0.46 % 95.13 % DWs 0 / 200 / 2k / 10
2.99 min 0.54 % 98.9 % DWs 0 / 200 / 2k / 15
2.94 min 0.53 % 97.80 % DWs 0 / 200 / 2k / 20
3.77 min 0.68 % 100 % DWs 0 / 200 / 2k / 25
2.94 min 0.53 % 97.80 % DWs 0 / 200 / 1k / 20
3.48 min 0.74 % 99.93 % DWs 0 / 200 / 3k / 20
4.80 min 0.86 % 100 % DWs 0 / 200 / 5k / 20
37.0 min 6.66 % 100 % Importance Sampling (IS)
556 min 100 % 100 % Brute Force (BF)
multi-machine model, the interested reader is referred to [29].
Machine parameters are taken from [30].
B. IEEE 14 bus system
Carrying out the first case study on a small system, where
the BF approach is still tractable, allows us to verify that our
method is capable of finding 100 % of the points belonging to
the HIC region. To ensure comparability, all simulations used
20 cores of the DTU HPC cluster.
Network data is given in [13], machine parameters are given
in [3]. The considered contingencies include all line faults
(except lines 7-8 and 6-131). Due to the BF approach, we
know that 1457 operating points belong to the HIC set, i.e.
with 2.75 % < ζmin < 3.25 %. The grid pruning without
considering any contingency does not reduce the search space
in this case study; this is because all possible combinations
of generation setpoints do not violate any limits for the given
load profile. Thus, η1 is chosen as 0 and we directly start with
the contingency-constrained grid pruning considering the five
most critical contingencies. Table I compares the performance
of our method with the BF approach and an Importance
Sampling (IS) approach [8]. Our method is capable of creating
a database including all points of interest in 3.77 min; that is
0.68 % of the time required by the BF approach (9.26 hours;
147 times faster). The proposed method is also significantly
faster (approx. 10 times) than an Importance Sampling ap-
proach (37.0 min).
One of the major advantages of our method is the drastic
search space reduction through the grid pruning and the most
critical contingency identification. In this case study, grid
pruning eliminated up to 70.13 % of all ≈ 2.5 · 106 potential
operating points (the number varies based on the number of
initialization points). At the same time, performing every DW
step for the single most critical contingency, we reduce the
required assessment from |C| systems to 1 system. In larger
systems the speed benefits will be even more pronounced, e.g.
14-bus: |C| = 19 contingencies are reduced to 1 (most critical);
162-bus: |C| = 160 contingencies reduced to 1.
Table I also compares the method’s performance for dif-
ferent numbers of initialization points η1−3 and maximum
number of DW steps κmax. In this system, choosing a higher
number of maximum steps instead of a higher number of
1The IEEE 14-bus and the NESTA 162-bus systems, based on the available
data, are not N-1 secure for all possible contingencies. The outage of those
specific lines lead to violations (e.g. voltage limits, component overloadings,
or small-signal instability) that no redispatching measure can mitigate. This
would not have happened in a real system. In order not to end up with an
empty set of operating points, and still use data publicly available, we choose
to neglect these outages.
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TABLE II
RESULTS: NESTA 162 BUS SYSTEM
Req. Unique Method
time OPs in Ω η1 / η2 / η3 / κmax
9.35 h 3118 Directed Walks 30k / 120k / 800k / 5
13.17 h 4166 Directed Walks 30k / 120k / 800k / 10
14.57 h 25046 Directed Walks 30k / 120k / 800k / 20
29.78 h 150790 Directed Walks 30k / 120k / 800k / 30
37.07 h 183295 Directed Walks 30k / 120k / 800k / 40
13.36 h 16587 Directed Walks 100k / 200k / 800k / 5
18.20 h 45040 Directed Walks 100k / 200k / 800k / 10
35.70 h 901 Importance Sampling (IS)
initialization points leads to time savings. The same holds in
larger systems, as shown in Table II.
In the highlighted case of Table I, the required computation
time for the different parts of our method is split as follows:
26.67 % (60.31 s) for the grid pruning considering the 5 most
critical contingencies (200 operating points); 53.1 % (120.12 s)
for the Directed Walks; and 20.24 % (45.78 s) for the final
N-1 check of all operating points. Grid pruning eliminates
1149 from the η3 = 2000 initialization points, resulting in
851 feasible starting points for the DWs. The most critical
contingency is detected correctly in 94.55 % of cases.
C. NESTA 162 bus system
In the second part of the case study, we demonstrate and
compare the performance of our method with an Importance
Sampling (IS) approach for N-1 security assessment of the
NESTA 162 Bus system. A BF approach with a 1 MW step
size for this system requires the assessment of 7.6 · 1029
operating points for a single load profile. The assessment of
all those points becomes computationally intractable. Thus,
the absolute number of unique OPs in Ω is unknown for
this system. Therefore, we focus on highlighting that the
proposed method finds significantly more unique OPs close
to the security boundary, i.e. creates a database of higher
quality, in comparable time frames. Then, we demonstrate how
the higher quality of the database allows machine learning
algorithms to achieve a higher accuracy within a data-driven
security assessment. Finally, we demonstrate how the proposed
method allows to extend the N-1 security assessment to a N-k
security assessment as described in section VII, here focusing
on N-2.
1) Database Generation for N-1 Security and Small-Signal
Stability Assessment: The set of considered contingencies
includes 159 line faults1. To ensure comparability, all sim-
ulations for the 162-bus system have been performed using
80 cores of the DTU HPC cluster. Compared to the IEEE
14 bus system, the problem size (potential # of OPs) is 23
orders of magnitude larger while the problem complexity (#
of faults) increased 6.2 times. Table II presents the results of
our method compared with an Importance Sampling approach
[8]. As the BF approach for this system is intractable, the exact
number of points within the HIC region (set Ω) is unknown.
Therefore, the focus here is on demonstrating that within
similar time frames, our proposed method is capable of finding
substantially more unique operating points inside Ω. Indeed,
our approach identifies approx. three orders of magnitude more
HIC points than an Importance Sampling approach (183’295
vs 901 points).
In the highlighted case of Table II, the computation time
is split as follows: 3.44 h (9.28 %) for LHS (3 stages), 1.85 h
(4.98 %) for both stages of grid pruning, 7.04 h (18.98 %) for
the DWs, and 24.75 h (66.76 %) for the final N-1 check of
all operating points of interest. This highlights that the most
computationally expensive part is the complete N-1 analysis
and shows why our proposed method is significantly faster
than others: (i) we reduce the search space by eliminating
infeasible N-1 points through the grid pruning algorithm, (ii)
we evaluate most points only for one contingency and discard
all with ζ < 2.75 %, and (iii) the method can largely be
scheduled in parallel.
2) N-1 Security and Small Signal Stability Assessment: As
the topic of this paper is the efficient database generation for
a data-driven security assessment, we briefly want to highlight
how important the higher quality of the databases created
by the proposed method is for such a data-driven security
assessment. There are three important factors to be considered
here: (i) The more time is needed to create a database of high
quality, the longer is the wait before the machine learning
algorithm can start its training phase. (ii) The more data
is needed to sufficiently describe a system, the longer the
algorithm needs to be trained. (iii) The further away points are
from the security boundary, the less information they contain
about the security boundary. Thus, it is essential that the
database contains many unique points close to the security
boundary enabling the algorithm to determine the security
boundary as accurately as possible [10].
In order to demonstrate the impact of the higher quality of
the database on the achievable accuracy of machine learning
algorithms, we implement a data-driven N-1 security and
small-signal stability assessment using a decision tree. Based
on lessons learned from previous works [3], we use the active
and reactive power flows on the lines as predictors and let the
decision tree classify between ‘fulfilling the requirements’ and
‘not fulfilling the requirements’ i.e. N-1 secure and a minimum
damping ratio ζmin ≥ 3 %, or not. This decision tree then
could be included in an optimal power flow, or in general an
optimization framework, as shown in [3], [4].
We compare the highlighted database in Table II with the
one created with Importance Sampling and also presented in
analyzed in Table II. Both required a comparable computation
time to be generated. For a fair comparison, we use as training
set all assessed operating points in each case; i.e. not only the
unique OPs in the HIC region listed in Table II, but rather all
OPs that were found in the safe, unsafe, and HIC regions
during these 35-37 hours. To simplify the comparison, we
used Matlab to train a simple decision tree using the standard
Classification and Regression Tree (CART) algorithm with
Gini’s diversity index as splitting criterion and without limiting
the tree depth. In order to avoid over-fitting, we used Matlab to
apply cost-complexity pruning, minimizing the cross-validated
classification error of the trees.
To test the accuracy of the two decision trees, one of which
was trained on the database created with our approach and
the other a database created with the Importance Sampling
method, we use a common test set of 90’000 operating points.
To avoid favoring one of the two database generation methods,
we created the test set by merging two datasets. Thus, 50%,
i.e. 45’000 data points, are generated through an importance
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sampling approach using initialization values different from
the ones used for the training set. The other 45’000 data points
of the test set are taken from our last database generation at-
tempt with our method shown in Table II, where we generated
45’040 unique points in Ω in 18.20 h (please note though that
the 45’000 points of the test set were picked from a wide range
of points generated during that process, which are located in
the safe, unsafe, and HIC region). For that attempt we used
η1 = 100k, η2 = 200k and η3 = 800k, which means that
this part of the test set also had different initialization points
from the training set. In both cases we ensured that none of
the data-points in the test set were part of any training set.
Thus, this is completely unseen data and allows to evaluate
the generalization capability of the trained classifiers.
The decision tree trained on the highlighted database in
Table II, which was generated with our method, achieves an
accuracy of 85.91 % while the tree trained on the database
created with IS achieves an accuracy of 73.00 %. As properties
of the test set might have an impact on the accuracy score,
additional measures are usually examined for the performance
of machine learning algorithms. Besides accuracy, an impor-
tant measure of the quality of the classification is the number
of true and false positives and negatives. The Matthews corre-
lation coefficient (MCC) is generally regarded as a balanced
measure for the quality of the binary classification. The MCC2
is in essence a correlation coefficient between the observed and
predicted binary classifications, returning a value between -1
and +1. A value of +1 means perfect prediction, 0 means no
better than random prediction, and -1 indicates total disagree-
ment. In our case, the decision tree trained with our method has
MCCDW = 0.6247, while the tree trained with importance
sampling has MCCIS = −0.0943. This highlights the over-
optimistic results of the accuracy measure and the significant
better performance of the tree trained on the database created
with our proposed method.
As the only difference between the configuration of the
two decision trees is the database each tree was trained on,
this emphasizes the importance of a high quality database
to achieve the best possible results in a data-driven security
assessment. More advanced machine learning algorithms may
achieve even better results; this is, however, out of the scope
of this paper. All created operating points are collected and
published on GitHub [32].
3) Database Generation for N-2 Security Assessment: To
demonstrate how the proposed method is capable of extending
a N-1 security assessment to an N-k security assessment, we
used the highlighted N-1 database in Table II as a starting
point. Similar to the N-1 case, for specific contingencies we
were unable to obtain a N-2 secure system1. As a result, we
had to relax the voltage limits to 0.9 p.u. ≤ Vi ≤ 1.1 p.u.
for all contingencies, and remove the line fault on the line
between bus 125 and bus 126 from the contingency list. Thus,
in the N-2 security analysis the set of considered contingencies
includes 158 line faults.
In order to avoid the creation of unnecessary duplicates
and minimize computation, all data-points located in the
2MCC = TP ·TN−FP ·FN√
(TP+FP )(TP+FN)(TN+FP )(TN+FN)
, −1 ≤
MCC ≤ 1 with TP and TN representing the correctly identified positive
and negative samples and FP and FN representing the falsely classified
negative and positive samples [31].
vicinity of other data-points from the HIC region of the N-1
security analysis, i.e. all OPs located within a radius of 5 MW
surrounding another OP, are discarded. The remaining OPs
serve as initialization points for a new round of directed walks
as described in section VII. Within 8.5 h we obtain a database
with 52’107 unique OPs that belong to ΩN−2. 33.2 % of the
time, i.e. 2.8 h, is used for the directed walks while 66.8 % of
the time, i.e. 5.7 h, is required by the final N-2 contingency
check. Hence, we obtain a 24 % speed-up compared to the
creation of the N-1 security database highlighted in Tab. II.
This speed-up is achieved because the first half of the method,
i.e. the creation of the initialization points and the grid pruning,
is not required when starting from the N-1 case.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
This work proposes an efficient database generation method
that can accurately determine power system security bound-
aries, while drastically reducing computation time. Such
databases are fundamental to any Dynamic Security Assess-
ment (DSA) method, as the information in historical data is
not sufficient, containing very few abnormal situations. This
topic has not received the appropriate attention in the literature,
with the few existing approaches proposing methods based on
importance sampling.
Our approach is highly scalable, modular, and achieves dras-
tic speed-ups compared with existing methods. It is composed
of two parts. First, the search space reduction, which quickly
discards large infeasible regions leveraging advancements in
convex relaxation techniques and complex network theory
approaches. Second, the “Directed Walks”, a highly paralleliz-
able algorithm, which efficiently explores the search space and
can determine the security boundary with extremely high ac-
curacy. Using a number of initialization points, a variable step
size, and based on a steepest descent method, the “Directed
Walk” algorithm traverses fast through large parts of feasible
(or infeasible) regions, while it focuses on the high information
content area in the vicinity of the security boundary. Our case
studies on the IEEE 14-bus and the NESTA 162-bus system
demonstrate the high quality, high scalability and excellent
performance of our algorithm. They are able to identify up to
100% of the operating points around the security boundary,
while achieving computational speed-ups of over 10 to 20
times compared with an importance sampling approach. We
also demonstrated the importance of a high quality database
to achieve the best possible results in a data-driven security
assessment. Given equal computation time, training machine
learning algorithms with the database generated by our method
clearly outperforms other approaches.
Our approach is modular, not dependent on the initial
sampling set (as importance sampling is), and agnostic to the
security criteria used to define the security boundary. Criteria
to be used include N-1 or N-k security, small-signal stability,
voltage stability, or a combination of several of them. The
method can find application in off-line security assessment, in
real-time operation, and in machine learning and other data-
driven applications, providing a computationally efficient way
to generate the required data for training and testing of new
methods.
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